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FROM TAILWIND TO TYPHOON: ALLIANCE TO PROTECT
NANTUCKET SOUND, INC. V ENERGY FACILITIES SITING BD.
BLOWS FEDERAL JURISDICTION INLAND AND CREATES
DANGEROUS PRECEDENT UNDER
SLIPSHOD INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
"Our decision about energy will test the character of the
American people and the ability of the President and the
Congress to govern. This difficult effort will be the 'moral
equivalent of war'-except that we will be uniting our ef-
forts to build and not destroy."'
President Jimmy Carter delivered the above statement in his
address to the nation on energy on April 18, 1977.2 Through his
speech, President Carter invoked fear of an impending energy crisis
that would threaten to topple United States' sovereignty, destroy
the environment, halt the transportation system, cause rampant in-
flation, decrease production, and increase unemployment.3 Over
thirty years later, President Barack Obama echoed President Jimmy
Carter's sentiment that America's demand for energy had left the
nation economically and politically vulnerable.4 He further recog-
nized, "The nation that leads the world in creating new energy
sources will be the nation that leads the 21st-century global
economy."5
The federal government provided incentives for both consum-
ers and producers to share an interest and participate in the clean
1. President Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, The President's
Proposed Energy Policy, 1 (Apr. 18, 1977), available at http://alternativeenergy.
procon.org/sourcefiles/Carter'sSpeech.pdf (transcribing President Carter's na-
tionally televised speech concerning impending energy crisis and President's Pro-
posed Energy Policy).
2. See id. at 1 (providing context for speech).
3. See id. at 3-4 (quoting President Carter). "If we fail to act soon, we will face
an economic, social, and political crisis that will threaten our free institutions." Id.
at 4.
4. See President Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by
the President on Clean Energy (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.white
house.gov/ThePressOffice/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Newton-IA/ (showing
America accounts for less than 5% of world population, but produces about 25%
of world oil demand).
5. Id. (describing President Obama's unveiled program to develop renewable
energy projects for U.S. outer continental shelf).
(247)
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energy initiative through programs awarding tax credits, direct sub-
sidies, loan guarantees, and grants to spur investment.6 Such initia-
tives helped spark venture capital investment, which in turn created
new technology and caused growth of renewable energy sources.7
Experts anticipate a 72% increase in electricity generation from re-
newable resources by 2035, the majority of which will be generated
by new wind and biomass facilities.8 Currently, all wind facilities in
the United States are located on land; however, the federal govern-
ment seeks to lease federal waters for wind projects, which could
potentially generate as much as 20% of United States' electricity by
2030.9
With increasing pressure from the federal government for
rapid renewable energy growth, state and local governments have
implemented various mechanisms to comply with environmental
laws and regulations and evaluate the environmental impact of re-
newable energy projects.10 Critics opine these "rules, regulations,
and bureaucratic red tape" may slow or even halt critical renewable
energy projects." Renewable energy projects are heavily litigated
because of the relative novelty of renewable energy resources and
the tensions between state and federal governments concerning
these projects.12
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently consid-
ered some of the issues surrounding renewable energy.' 3 In Alli-
6. See id. (enumerating federal government created incentives with goal of
doubling "nation's capacity to generate renewable energy").
7. See id. (explaining results of government initiated incentives concerning
renewable energy). "In 2000, energy technology represented just one half of one
percent of all venture capital investments. Today, it's more than 10 percent." Id.
8. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2001 WITH PROJEC-
TIONS To 2035 3 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/
0383(2011).pdf (last accessed Jan. 21, 2012) (showing growth in wind plants is
driven by State renewable portfolio standard requirements and Federal tax
credits).
9. See Obama, supra note 4 and accompanying text (acknowledging govern-
ment's interest in renewable energy initiatives).
10. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 201N-8 (2008) (describing Hawaii's review for
environment impact of renewable energy projects); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1197.7
(West 2009) (describing Virginia's process for review and authorization of renewa-
ble energy projects).
11. See Nick Juliano, Republicans' Renewable Bills May Increase Litigation: Obama
Officials, PLArrs (Jun. 23, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailed
News/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6215665 (quoting Rep. Doug Lamborn) (explor-
ing difficulties created by state regulations or "red tape").
12. See id. (elaborating on bills Republicans hope to pass to lower litigation
levels surrounding renewable energy).
13. For a discussion of the issues considered by the court, see infra notes 17-20
and accompanying text.
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ance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Board
(Alliance),14 the court furthered the federal government's desire to
streamline the local permit application process required for renew-
able energy initiatives.15 Specifically, the court upheld the Energy
Facilities Siting Board's (Siting Board) decision to allow Cape Wind
Associates (Cape Wind) to construct the necessary transmission
lines for a wind-powered energy-generating facility on Horseshoe
Shoal in Nantucket Sound.16
The court first resolved several jurisdictional authority claims
related to the first proposed offshore wind farm in the United
States.1 7 The Cape Cod Commission (Commission) denied Cape
Wind's proposed development of regional impact (DRI) in 2007,
and the court had to determine whether the Siting Board could
override the Commission's prior decision.18 The court also settled
whether the Siting Board had the requisite authority to grant any
type of license relating to the Massachusetts' tidelands.19 Lastly, the
court addressed whether the Siting Board had jurisdiction to con-
sider the "in-state impacts" of a wind farm located in federal wa-
ters.20 The court's resolution of each jurisdictional issue effectively
combined to streamline the approval procedures for proposed off-
shore wind-power generating facilities. 21 Such resolutions, how-
ever, permitted a dangerous lack of accountability for federally
authorized energy projects located in federal waters by not allowing
states to consider the in-state impact of the facility. 22
This Casenote examines the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts' opinion in Alliance, rationalizes the impact of the decision
on other pending wind-farm proposals, and predicts the subse-
14. 932 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 2010).
15. See id. at 799-800 (implying effectiveness of having unified, uniform over-
sight by Siting Board was important to expedite process for wind farm).
16. See id. at 815 (stating holding of case).
17. See id. at 787 (outlining background of Cape Wind proposed facility). See
generally Juliet Eilperin, Offshore Wind Farm Near Cape Cod, First in U.S., Gets Federal
Approval, THE WASHINGTON PosT (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.WashingtonPost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/28/AR2010042804398.html (describing
Cape Wind's legal success as first approved offshore wind farm in United States).
18. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 796-98 (holding Siting Board could appropri-
ately approve Cape Wind's proposal).
19. See id. at 798-803 (describing Siting Board's authority in relation to public
trust doctrine).
20. See id. at 803-06 (considering whether local authorities had jurisdiction to
consider in-state effects of federally located facility).
21. For an analysis of the court's reasoning concerning in-state impacts, see
infra notes 142-152 and accompanying text.
22. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 816 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (hypothesizing
about future consequences of case holding).
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quent impact of the case on future renewable energy legislation,
investment, and offshore facilities.23 Part II provides a detailed
summary of the facts of Alliance.24 A background of relevant court
decisions and underlying government incentives that led to the de-
cision in this case follows in Part 111.25 Part IV then examines the
process through which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts reached its decision. 26 Next, Part V considers the court's deci-
sion in conjunction with previous court decisions and the
governing policies of each agency involved.27 Finally, Part VI
predicts the positive and negative impact of Alliance on future inter-
pretations of offshore energy facility approval procedures and ad-
dresses the consequences of the court's jurisdictional
determinations concerning the in-state impacts of offshore renewa-
ble energy facilities.28
II. FACTS
In Alliance, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts deter-
mined whether a "composite of the 'individual permits, approvals
or authorizations which would otherwise be necessary for the con-
struction and operation' of the transmission project" issued by the
Siting Board could overrule a previous denial of a DRI by the Com-
mission.29 Cape Wind planned to construct a wind farm of 130
23. For a discussion of the decision's impact on future approval procedures,
see infra notes 214-221 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the facts of Alliance, see infra notes 29-64 and accompa-
nying text.
25. For background material pertaining to the public trust doctrine and a
discussion of relevant court decisions, see infra notes 65-123 and accompanying
text.
26. For a narrative analysis of Alliance, see infra notes 124-162 and accompany-
ing text.
27. For a discussion of the critical analysis of Alliance, see infra notes 163-196
and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the impact of the Alliance holding, see infra notes 197-
221 and accompanying text.
29. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 791 (Mass. 2010) (stating main issue of case). DRI approval is
required when a development is likely to present a significant impact on one or
more municipality in Barnstable County. Cape Cod Commission-Regional Land Use
Plan, 1989 Mass. Legis. Serv. 716 (West 1990). Numerous standards and criteria
are included into a DRI and the decision surrounding it including the impact of
the development on natural resources, existing capital facilities, the physical size of
the development, the employees generated by the development, the location of
the development, the importance of the development to economic development,
and any other factors of regional concern that the Commission may determine. Id.
4
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wind turbine generators in Nantucket Sound.30 The facility's pro-
posed location was more than three miles from any Massachusetts
coast, and thus entirely in federal waters.31 In order to carry the
electricity generated at the wind farm to an existing power grid,
however, Cape Wind had to construct 18.4 miles of transmission
lines through Massachusetts land.32 After reviewing the proposed
wind farm for three-years, the Siting Board approved construction
of the transmission line facilities in 2005.33 The actual construction
of the transmission lines, however, required additional approvals
from various state and local authorities. 34
Beginning in 2002, Cape Wind sought the appropriate ap-
proval required to construct the transmission lines, received Siting
Board Approval in 2005, and thereafter acquired several other nec-
essary approvals.35 But after public hearings and several requests
30. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 791 (describing physical specifications of facility).
Each of the wind turbine generators were planned to be 440 feet tall. Id.
31. Id. (demonstrating actual facility was located in federal waters); see also 43
U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (noting outer continental shelf is area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction). The outer continental shelf encompasses any area extending from
three to 200 miles offshore. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006).
32. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 791-92 (describing physical locations of transmis-
sion lines). The proposed lines will run "under the seabed through Nantucket
Sound and Lewis Bay for 12.5 miles, coming ashore in the town of Yarmouth[ ],
and continuing underground for 5.9 miles through Yarmouth and Barnstable to
an existing switching station in Barnstable." Id. at 792.
33. See id. at 793 (reiterating court's 2006 decision). The Siting Board acted
pursuant to § 69J of the Massachusetts General Laws to approve the facility. Id.
Section 69J stipulates:
No applicant shall commence construction of a facility at a site unless a
petition for approval of construction of that facility has been approved by
the board and, in the case of an electric or gas company which is required
to file a long-range forecast pursuant to section sixty-nine I, that facility is
consistent with the most recently approved long-range forecast for that
company.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 69J (West, Westlaw through 2012).
34. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 792-93 (describing requisite permits and ap-
provals for Cape Wind). Cape Wind was required to obtain multiple permits and
underwent a joint review by the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental
Affairs and the Commission. Id. at 792. The Commission eventually denied ap-
proval of a development of regional impact (DRI), which left Cape Wind to either
appeal to the Commission or petition the Siting Board for a composite certificate
encompassing all necessary permits for the transmission lines. Id. at 793. In lieu of
appealing the permit denial, Cape Wind sought the composite certificate which
was eventually granted by the Siting Board. Id. at 794.
35. Id. at 792-95 (providing history of various permits and approvals obtained
by Cape Wind). Cape Wind sought approval from the Siting Board to construct
transmission lines in 2002. Id. at 792-93. The court affirmed the Siting Board's
2005 decision granting approval in 2006, and Cape Wind had the requisite ap-
proval to seek other state and federal approvals. Id. at 793. In seeking state and
regulatory approvals, Cape Wind filed an expanded environmental notification for
with the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (EOEEA). Id. at
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for additional information from Cape Wind, the Commission de-
nied Cape Wind's DRI application in October 2007 because Cape
Wind failed to submit "the full body of information" requested by
the Commission.36 Without exercising its right to appeal the DRI
denial to the local county superior court, Cape Wind filed a peti-
tion with the Siting Board to obtain a certificate that would serve as
"a composite of all individual permits, approvals or authorizations
which would be otherwise necessary for the construction and opera-
tion of the facility."37 The Siting Board certificate included the
equivalent of the DRI application previously denied by the Commis-
sion, as well as eight additional mandatory state and local permits.38
One of the additional eight permits was a tidelands license, which
was "generally within the regulatory jurisdiction of [Department of
Environmental Protection] ."3 In May 2009, after months of hear-
ings, testimony, written discovery, and witness testimony, the Siting
Board granted Cape Wind the composite certificate. 40
The court categorized the petitioner's numerous challenges on
appeal: the Siting Board's jurisdictional authority, the validity of the
Siting Board's decision, and the legality of a Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (DEP) regulation. 41 Regarding the Siting
Board's jurisdictional authority to override the Commission's DRI
decision, the petitioners argued the statutory language of the Cape
Cod Act, which was enacted after the Siting Board's enabling stat-
ute, provided the petitioners could appeal the Commission's DRI
denial only to the local superior court.42 The court "presume [d]
that the Legislature act[ed] with full knowledge of existing laws,"
792. The Commission and the EOEEA then undertook a joint review of Cape
Wind's proposal under the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act (MEPA).
Id. The project was found to be in compliance with MEPA by the EOEEA, but the
Commission did not issue DRI approval. Id. at 793.
36. Id. at 793 (detailing history of Commission's DRI denial).
37. Id. at 794 (quoting MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West, Westlaw
through 2012)) (providing history of Cape Wind permit process with Siting
Board).
38. Id. (describing § 69K certificate).
39. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 794 (distinguishing tidelands licenses as tradi-
tionally under DEP jurisdiction).
40. Id. at 794-95 (describing process by which Siting Board granted composite
certificate). The five government entities with permits at issue consisted of: Barnst-
able, Yarmouth, the DEP, the Executive Office of Transportation and Public
Works, and the Commission. Id. at 794.
41. Id. at 795 (combining appeals and describing categories under which
each falls). Petitioners include sixteen individuals, the town of Barnstable, and the
Commission. Id. at 699 n.1.
42. Id. at 796 (outlining petitioner's argument concerning relationship be-
tween Cape Cod Act and Siting Board's enabling statute).
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and noted the Cape Cod Act and the Siting Board's enabling stat-
ute must operate harmoniously together to provide consistency.43
Under this presumption, the court held the Siting Board had the
appropriate jurisdiction to override the Commission's DRI denial.4 4
The petitioners also averred the Siting Board did not have the
authority to grant a certificate containing any type of license relat-
ing to Massachusetts' tidelands because the public trust doctrine
required an express delegation of authority, which was traditionally
entrusted to the DEP.4 5 The court determined the Siting Board
had the express authority to assume all the powers and obligations
"of any and all [s] tate and local agencies with permitting authority
over a proposed facility."4 6 It recognized the broad language of the
Siting Board's enabling statute included the powers of the DEP.4 7
The court further reasoned if the Siting Board did not adopt the
findings of the DEP concerning a tideland license, it was required
to undertake the same reviewing process the DEP did.48 Ultimately,
the court affirmed the Siting Board's approval of Cape Wind's re-
quest for the equivalent of a tideland license.49
The petitioners contended the Siting Board was obligated to
consider the in-state impacts of the entire wind farm project in issu-
ing the composite certificate, even though the main facility was lo-
cated entirely in federal waters.50 According to the court, such an
obligation would render the Siting Board's jurisdiction paramount
43. Id. at 796-97 (showing Cape Cod Act and Siting Board's enabling statute
were contradictory, thus creating inconsistency). If the court read the two statutes
as the petitioners suggested, the Siting Board would apply everywhere in Massachu-
setts, save Barnstable County. Id. at 797. Since the Siting Board maintains respon-
sibility to "provide a reliable energy supply for the commonwealth," such a reading
violates the responsibility of the Siting Board. Id. (quoting MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 164, § 69H (West, Westlaw through 2012)).
44. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 797 (holding purpose of Siting Board's was to con-
sider needs of broader committee and trumped Commission's DRI denial).
45. Id. at 798-99 (describing petitioners argument under public trust
doctrine).
46. Id. at 799-800 (internal quotation marks omitted) (showing broad inter-
pretation of Massachusetts General Law § 69K encompasses DEP as agency over
which Siting Board had authority).
47. Id. at 800 (concluding legislature expressly vested authority in Siting
Board to act in place of DEP).
48. Id. (showing Siting Board had more than just power to act in place of
DEP).
49. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 803 (affirming Siting Board decision concerning
tideland license). Further, the court accorded substantial discretion to the Siting
Board in interpreting § 69K, the statute it was charged with enforcing. Id. at 802.
50. Id. at 803 (stating petitioners' argument).
2012] 253
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to federal jurisdiction.51 The majority noted the enabling statute
only permitted the Siting Board to regulate a facility within its
jurisdiction. 52
After challenging the Siting Board's jurisdictional authority,
the petitioners attacked the substance of the Siting Board's decision
regarding the composite certificate.5 3 The petitioners argued Cape
Wind did not make the required good faith effort to obtain DRI
approval prior to seeking the composite certificate.54 The petition-
ers also claimed the Siting Board did not make sufficient eviden-
tiary findings concerning the need and cost of the facility,55 the
environmental impact of the transmission project,56 and the pro-
51. Id. at 802-03 (holding Siting Board obligation to consider in-state impacts
renders Siting Board jurisdiction paramount to federal jurisdiction). The court
read §§ 69J, 69K, and 690 literally to focus on the "physical facility" under the
Siting Board's jurisdiction, which, in the case at hand, is only the two 115 kilovolt
electric transmission lines located within three miles of shore. Id. at 803-05. Peti-
tioners did not contest the transmission lines were the only facility located in state
waters. Id. at 803. The court, therefore, interpreted facility to encompass purely
physical structures. Id.
52. Id. at 803 (restricting Siting Board's jurisdiction by defining facility as
merely physical and not inclusive of in-state impacts on physical facilities outside
of, but connected to, state jurisdiction).
53. Id. at 807 (identifying petitioners' contentions about substance of Siting
Board's decision).
54. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 808 (supplying petitioners' argument concerning
good faith effort). Massachusetts General Law § 69L(A) requires a composite cer-
tificate applicant finalize a statement including a representation of a good faith
effort made by applicant to obtain licenses, permits, and other approvals required
from state agencies and local governments. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 164,
§ 69L(A) (West, Westlaw through 2012). Petitioners contended that, because the
Cape Wind delayed production of site control evidence until shortly before the
Commission's DRI decision deadline, it did not exhibit a good faith effort. Alli-
ance, 932 N.E.2d at 808. The Siting Board argued, and the court agreed, that Cape
Wind's history of participation and agreement to extend the DRI decision dead-
line by two weeks to give the Commission additional time was substantial evidence
of good faith effort to obtain a DRI approval. Id.
55. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 809-10 (providing petitioners' argument that find-
ings related to need and cost were not made). Section 690 of the Massachusetts
General Laws requires findings on the need of the facility to meet the energy re-
quirements of the applicant's market with various other power measures taken
into account and a necessary energy supply at the lowest possible cost. MASs. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch 164, § 690 (West, Westlaw through 2012). The Commission argued
the Siting Board heard no evidence concerning the need for the project to meet
the energy requirements of Cape Wind's market area. Alliance, 932 N.E,2d at 811.
The Siting Board, however, looked to its earlier decisions finding the existing
transmission system was inadequate to support the wind farm and that the new
transmission project was needed for the proposed wind farm to contribute to the
regional energy supply. Id. at 811-12.
56. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 811-13 (discussing petitioners' argument concern-
ing environmental impact). Petitioners argued the Siting Board made insufficient
findings concerning the environmental impact of the transmission lines on the
environment. Id. at 811. The petitioners specifically contended the Siting Board
8
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ject's conformance with existing law.5 7 Despite these contentions,
the court concluded the Siting Board properly relied on the eviden-
tiary findings from previous proceedings, its previous decisions on
the Cape Wind project, and prior reviews by petitioners to issue the
composite certificate.58
Lastly, one of the petitioners, Alliance to Protect Nantucket
Sound, challenged the DEP's water-dependent use regulation creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption that facilities with a water-dependent
use serve a "proper public purpose."59 The DEP previously deter-
mined Cape Wind's proposed transmission lines was a water-depen-
dent use, and the Siting Board adopted the DEP's determination
into its decision to grant the composite certificate.6 0 The Alliance
to Protect Nantucket Sound argued the DEP must evaluate the im-
pacts of the actual energy-generating facility to decide whether an
infrastructure is water-dependent, and then apply the public cost-
benefit analysis test for those infrastructures deemed water-depen-
dent.6 1 The court afforded a highly deferential standard of review
to the DEP's water-dependent use regulation,, , which "applies
solely to 'infrastructure facilities used to deliver electricity . . . from
an offshore facility [,]' not to the offshore facility itself."62 While the
DEP did not consider the impacts of the facility, it did not have the
did not conduct the proper surveys, improperly relied on surveys already com-
pleted, and failed to consider the in-state impacts of the federally located part of
the wind farm. Id.
57. Id. at 813 (presenting petitioners' argument concerning conformance
with existing law). Petitioners suggested a "reasonableness of exemption" stan-
dard, as enumerated in § 690, required the Siting Board to review in-state impacts
of Cape Wind's entire facility. Id. The court reiterated the Siting Board did not
have jurisdiction over the federally located part of the facility and could only re-
view the part of the facility in itsjurisdiction. Id. The Siting Board "properly relied
on its findings in the §§ 69J and 72 proceedings where § 690(3) directs it to review
reasonableness." Id.
58. Id. at 811-13 (stating court's holding concerning substance of Siting
Board decision and resolution of each of petitioner's contentions with Siting
Board analysis of environmental impact).
59. Id. at 813-15 (providing both parties' arguments on validity of DEP's
water-dependent use regulation). Water-dependent uses are "those uses and facili-
ties which require direct access to, or location in, marine or tidal waters and which
therefore cannot be located inland." Id. at 814 (emphasis omitted). Alliance to
Protect Nantucket Sound argued because wind farms can be located inland they
are not water-dependent. Id.
60. Id. at 814 (explaining Siting Board's use of DEP's determination that
Cape Wind facility was water-dependent).
61. Id. at 815 (providing Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound's argument
that infrastructure facility is not water-dependent).
62. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 814-15 (quoting 310 MAss. CODE REGs. § 9.31(2) (a)
(1996)) (stating court's interpretation of water-dependent use regulation and
applicability).
2012] 255
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authority to do so because the wind farm is located entirely offshore
in federal waters.63 Thus, the court agreed with the DEP's water-
dependent use regulation and ultimately upheld the Siting Board's
issuance of the composite certificate to Cape Wind.64
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Relationship Between the Energy Facilities Siting Board
and the Cape Cod Commission
The statutorily created Energy Facilities Siting Board is
charged with "providi[ing] a reliable energy supply for [Massachu-
setts] with a minimum impact on the environment at the lowest
possible cost."65 The governing statute requires the Siting Board
review "the need for, cost of, and environmental impacts of trans-
mission lines" when implementing various statutory provisions.66
Specifically, electric companies may seek a Siting Board-issued com-
posite certificate composed of "all individual permits, approvals or
authorizations which would otherwise be necessary for the construc-
tion and operation of the [proposed] facility," if it cannot be con-
structed due to any disapproval from state or local agencies.67 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, "The intent and
purpose of the statute [ I] is in part to ensure that local boards do
not use their power over licenses and permits to thwart the needs of
the broader community for a reliable, affordable, and environmen-
tally sound energy supply."68
In 1989, the Massachusetts' legislature enacted the Cape Cod
Act to protect the unique historical and environmental characteris-
tics of Cape Cod.69 The Cape Cod Act, in turn, established the
Cape Cod Commission.70 The Commission is a regional planning
63. Id. at 815 (providing court's holding on water-dependent use regulation).
64. Id. (providing holding of court).
65. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West, Westlaw through 2012),
(providing oversight by state and local governments for Siting Board establishment
and procedures).
66. Id. (providing areas of Siting Boardjurisdiction). Sections 69H to 69Q list
numerous permits, approvals, authorizations, and powers of the Siting Board and
thus are considered the "enabling statute." Id. at §§ 69H, 69Q. These sections also
provide the required review process of the Siting Board in exercising their powers.
Id.
67. Id. at § 68K (describing certificate of environmental impact and public
interest).
68. City Council of Agawam v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 776 N.E.2d 1002,
1007 (2002) (providing purpose of Siting Board).
69. Cape Cod Commission-Regional Land Use Plan, 1989 Mass. Legis. Serv. 716
(West 1990) (providing purpose and direction of Cape Cod Act).
70. See id. (establishing Cape Cod Commission).
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agency that prepares and reviews DRI applications in order to issue
DRI certificates.71 The Commission's enabling act provides, "Any
party aggrieved by a [C]ommission decision on a development of
regional impact may appeal the [C] ommission's decision to the
Barnstable county superior court or the land court" and "[t]he
foregoing remedy shall be exclusive." 72
The Siting Board's power to grant a composite certificate,
which is inclusive of a DRI certificate, and the system of internal
appeal established by the Cape Cod Act are contradictory upon first
glance; however, Suliveres v. Commonwealth73 and Commonwealth v.
Hanis (Han7is)7 4 demonstrate that courts presume the legislature
acted with knowledge of existing laws.7 5 Courts thus work to har-
monize and accomplish the purposes of both statutes, unless the
prior legislation is so inconsistent with a later enactment that both
statutes cannot coexist.76 Despite such a legal truism, the public
trust doctrine has created jurisdictional discrepancies between typi-
cally conjoined local and federal agencies.77
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
Under the public trust doctrine, Massachusetts holds its tide-
lands in trust for the public to use for traditional water-dependent
purposes-fishing, fowling, and navigation.78 When individuals use
the tidelands for nontraditional purposes the legislature mandates
the non water-dependent use "serve a proper public purpose."7 9
Massachusetts' law expressly obligates the DEP "to preserve and
71. See AnnMarie French, Understanding Developments of Regional Impact, NEW
HAMPSHIRE TowN AND Crr (May 2008), available at http://www.nhlgc.org/publica-
tions/itemdetail.asp?TCArticlelD=102 (elaborating on DRIs and their purpose).
72. See supra note 69 at § 17(b), (d) (describing Commission's appeal
process).
73. 865 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 2007).
74. 825 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 2005).
75. Compare Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Mass. 2007)
(holding legislature acts with full knowledge of existing laws), with Commonwealth
v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Mass. 2005) (showing, without disabling inconsis-
tency, two statutes can be read together, giving meaning and purpose to both).
76. See Harris, 825 N.E.2d at 67 (implying courts should actively attempt to
harmonize statutes).
77. See infra notes 78-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the juris-
dictional tensions created by the public trust doctrine.
78. Moot v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 861 N.E.2d 410, 412 (2007) (describing his-
tory of General Laws chapter 91 and its history from public trust doctrine).
79. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2012)
(describing parameters of public trust doctrine). A "water-dependent use" project
must consist entirely of uses determined to be water-dependent and requiring di-
rect access to water or located in marine or tidal waters. See id.
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protect the rights in tidelands of the inhabitants of the common-
wealth by ensuring that the tidelands are utilized only for water-
dependent uses or otherwise serve a proper public purpose."80
Whether other Massachusetts' agencies have any power over tide-
lands, however, is often unclear because the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts historically emphasized the importance of
using express language to grant tideland authority.81
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Fafard v. Con-
servation Commission of Barnstable (Fafard) ,82 held only "the Com-
monwealth [of Massachusetts] or its express designee may act to
further public trust rights."83 In Fafard, a local commission denied
an application for the construction of a pier on a local river and
maintained it had the authority to protect "interests of recreation
and public trust rights."84 The court explained that "[a]bsent a
grant of authority from [Massachusetts], a municipality may not
claim powers to act on behalf of public trust rights."85 The court
thus prohibited the town from administering public trust rights on
behalf of the DEP absent an express legislative delegation or "a
grant of authority from the DEP."8 6 But the court recognized local
commissions could adopt public trust doctrine standards more
stringent than those in Massachusetts' law because Massachusetts
only "'establishe [d] minimum [s] tate-wide standards."87 The local
commission's stricter tideland controls were permissible provided
they "d[id] not usurp the DEP's authority to deny licenses or per-
mits to applicants" who sought to construct structures not serving a
proper public purpose.88
80. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (show-
ing public trust doctrine requirement applicable to case at hand).
81. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the confu-
sion surrounding which entities have power to control aspects of the public trust
doctrine.
82. 733 N.E.2d 66 (Mass. 2000).
83. Id. at 68 (stating holding of court).
84. Id. at 69 (describing Commission's basis for decision on town bylaws and
regulations with authority over public trust rights).
85. Id. at 71 (providing express delegation is necessary for tideland
protection).
86. Id. at 76 (concluding bylaws are void because they claim to protect public
trust rights). The court in Farland eventually upheld the Commission's denial of
the pier permit on the basis of powers granted by Legislature to local conservation
commissions rather than under the commission's claim to protect public trust
rights. Id.
87. Fafard, 733 N.E.2d at 72 (explaining local entities can require tideland
controls in addition to minimum standard provided by state).
88. Id. (noting DEP must still have ability deny permits when not serving
"proper public purpose[s]").
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Moot v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (Moot)89 further demonstrated the
importance of express legislative language authorizing the DEP to
determine whether a non water-dependent use is for proper public
purpose.90 At issue in Moot were DEP-promulgated regulations that
indicated the areas subject to licensing and permitting and ex-
empted all landlocked tidelands from such requirements.9 1 The
defendants sought to construct a project under the landlocked ex-
emption.92 The court stated the DEP could only regulate the tide-
lands subject to the authority expressly granted by the state.93 But
by exempting the landlocked tidelands from the licensing require-
ments, the DEP regulation "fail[ed] to provide for a method by
which the department could determine the proper public purpose
of nonwater-dependent uses" as required by state law.9 4 The DEP
had thus forgone its responsibility to preserve and protect the pub-
lic's rights in tidelands.9 5 Moreover, the DEP "d[id] not have the
authority to relinquish or extinguish the public's rights in any of
the [Massachusetts'] tidelands, except on terms expressly author-
ized by the [1]egislature." 96 The court concluded the DEP ex-
ceeded its authority by abandoning its obligation to ensure all non
water-dependent uses of the land serve a proper public purpose.9 7
Despite the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' con-
servative interpretation of express authorization in Moot, it has
often upheld local bylaws that allow state agencies to regulate and
impose conditions to ensure interests described in the statute are
achieved.98 In Golden v. Board of Selectmen ofFalmouth (Golden) ," the
court acknowledged the legislature "did not attempt to cover the
89. 861 N.E.2d 410 (Mass. 2007).
90. Id. at 415-17 (demonstrating importance of express authorization grant-
ing DEP authority).
91. Id. at 414 (stating central issue of case).
92. Id. at 413-14 (showing licensing exemption allotted by DEP).
93. Id. at 412 (holding the exemption exceeded department authority).
94. Moot, 861 N.E.2d at 417-18 (stating additional issue of regulation's pre-
emption of DEP's duty to preserve and protect public's tideland rights).
95. See id. at 419-20 (demonstrating legislature alone has authority to rescind
public tideland rights through legislation).
96. Id. at 417 (limiting DEP's role concerning public interest rights).
97. Id. (showing DEP's relinquishment of obligation to protect public's rights
in tidelands).
98. Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858,
863-64 (Mass. 1979) (holding no conflict between state and local laws because lo-
cal law merely furthers state law); see also Golden v. Selectmen of Falmouth, 265
N.E.2d 573, 577 (Mass. 1970) (upholding local bylaw as consistent with Massachu-
setts Wetlands Protection Act).
99. Golden, 265 N.E.2d at 577 (explaining need for local control of wetlands).
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entire field of coastal wetlands regulations to the exclusion of regu-
lation by local authority."100 Moreover, Massachusetts' advances in
environmental control would be lost if local agencies were not
given regulatory authority.101
C. The Separation of State and Federal Jurisdiction and the
Intangible Complications
In 1953, Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA), which granted the jurisdiction of all submerged
lands under United States sovereign control or any fixed structures
lying seaward of a three-mile boundary from states' shores to the
federal government.102 In a landmark 1975 case, United States v.
Maine (Maine),103 the Supreme Court of the United States con-
firmed and reiterated "paramount rights to the offshore seabed in-
here in the Federal Government as an incident of national
sovereignty."10 4 The Court realized the economic and environmen-
tal importance of OCSLA and acknowledged that federal legislation
and commercial activity had already begun to exploit offshore re-
sources.' 05 While government emphasis on exploitation of offshore
natural resources has been clear for years, the tension between state
and federal authority over the permitting process required before
harvesting the natural resources is increasingly apparent. 06
Without clear legislative or judicial guidance, courts have
reached divergent conclusions regarding the overlap of state and
federal jurisdiction of offshore natural resources. 07 The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit attempted to balance
state and federal powers by holding an authority "cannot do indi-
100. Id. at 576 (providing legislative intent in regulating coastal wetlands ).
101. Id. at 577 (describing effect of uniform statutory scheme regarding pre-
serving and protecting coastal wetlands).
102. See 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (a) (2) (2006) (defining outer continental shelf); see
also 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (declaring outer continental shelf is subject to federal
jurisdiction).
103. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
104. See id. at 524 (explaining state's historical claims to waters off-coast are
not precedential).
105. See Id. at 527-28 (providing statistics from 1953-75 to demonstrate
amount of natural resources extracted from outer Continental Shelf).
106. For a discussion ofjurisdictional tensions and complications arising from
offshore initiatives, see supra notes 102-105, infra notes 107-119 and accompanying
text.
107. For a comparison of two different authorities and their divergent out-
comes concerning the overlap of state and federal jurisdiction, see infra notes 108-
124 and accompanying text.
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rectly what it is forbidden to do directly."108 In New England Legal
Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority (New England Legal),oI the
Federal Aviation Administration re-structured the landing fee
charged at Logan Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.' 10 The fee reg-
ulations attempted to control conduct rather than simply recover
operational costs; the First Circuit thus struck down the regulation
as invalid under federal law. 1"1
In Ten Taxpayer Citizens Group v. Cape Wind Associates, LLC (Ten
Taxpayer),1'2 the First Circuit took its position in New England Legal
one step further and prohibited Massachusetts from regulating any
facilities built on the outer continental shelf.113 Cape Wind sought
to construct a data collection tower located more than three miles
from the shore. 114 Though the plaintiffs conceded the facility was
within federal jurisdiction, they argued Cape Wind was required to
obtain state permits in addition to the permit already granted by
the federal government.115 The plaintiffs further contended Con-
gress gave Massachusetts the authority to regulate activities that af-
fected fishing in local waters, and Cape Wind's data collection
tower would in fact affect fishing in local waters. 1 6 Despite Massa-
chusetts' power to regulate activities affecting fishing in local wa-
108. See New England Legal Found. v. Mass. Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 174 (1st
Cir. 1989) (explaining regulatory entities cannot avoid direct prohibition of regu-
lation by regulating seemingly unrelated activities).
109. See id. (indicating state government was attempting to control federally
authorized activity).
110. See id. at 159 (describing new landing fee structure). The new landing
fee structure essentially increased the landing cost imposed on smaller aircraft and
reduced the landing cost for larger aircraft. Id.
111. Id. at 174 (holding on fee regulati6n). The court held the Port Author-
ity could appropriately enact a landing fee structure as long as it was not an at-
tempt to modify the conduct permitted under Federal Law. Id. In New England
Legal, the court struck down the fee structure because the landing fees were not an
attempt to recoup costs, but rather to control a federally permissible activity. Id. at
175. The court left room for state regulation of federally permissible conduct as
long as such regulation was not an attempt to control such conduct. Id. at 174.
112. 373 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004).
113. Id. at 197 (increasing restriction on state's ability to regulate federal
activity).
114. See id. at 186 (providing facts of case).
115. See id. (stating plaintiffs' main contention concerning jurisdictional au-
thority over Nantucket Sound).
116. Id. (explaining plaintiffs' additional contention that state had authority
to regulate any activity affecting local waters). The court admitted Congress gave
the state the power to regulate activities affecting marine environments and fisher-
ies within three miles of shore. Id. The court went on to show that federal law,
under OCSLA, also incorporated state law and its requirements to give exclusive
power over the Outer Continental shelf to the federal government. Id. at 197; see
also supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing wetland and offshore
jurisdiction).
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ters, the First Circuit concluded Massachusetts did not have a
"general warrant to 'polic [e] the entire Nantucket Sound for envi-
ronmental disturbances that could impact fishing."'"' The court
recognized federal law adopted those state laws concerning the
outer continental shelf that were consistent with OCSLA.118 But
the adopted state laws cannot require state agency approval for the
construction of facilities on the outer continental shelf, because this
"would effectively grant state governments a veto power over the
disposition of the national seabed" and federal activities outside of
the three mile limit.119
The Commission and a local town sought to regulate local
docking for a gambling boat in federal waters in Leisure Time Cruise
Corp. v. Town of Barnstable (Leisure Time).1 2 0 The regulations specifi-
cally targeted the gambling boat by regulating uses "ancillary to
[the gambling boat's] operation of its gambling cruise" in federal
waters. 121 The district court knew the defendants disapproved of
the boat's use for gambling, a use that sharply contrasted with state
laws banning gambling. 122 In clear distinction to the decision in
New England Legal, the district court held the applicable federal law
did not preempt the regulation.123
117. See Ten Taxpayer, 373 F.3d at 187 (quoting Ten Taxpayer Citizen Grp. v.
Cape Wind Assocs., LLC, 278 F. Supp. 2d 98, 101 (D. Mass. 2003)) (reiterating
holding of lower court which essentially limited state power to regulate fishing).
118. See id. at 192 (discussing OCSLA's adoption of state law). "[T]he
Magnuson-Stevens [Fishery and Conservation and Management] Act asserts fed-
eral control over the waters outside of the three-mile limit of state jurisdiction ....
[and] creates a 'national framework for conserving and managing marine fisher-
ies."' Id. at 189 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-276, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4073, 4074). The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation and
Management Act demonstrates that states can regulate fishing activities within
their borders, but the federal government has a system in place to manage fishing
activities outside the three-mile limit. See id.
119. Id. at 197 (providing hypothetical situation in which state jurisdiction
improperly trumps federal jurisdiction).
120. 62 F. Supp. 2d 202, 205-06 (D. Mass. 1999) (offering contrasting opinion
to other court opinions concerning state regulation of federal activity). Leisure
Time Cruise Corporation sought to operate a cruise for several hours twice daily.
Id. at 205. The cruise would carry passengers into federal waters in Nantucket
Sound for several hours of gambling and drinking in an attempt to avoid state
regulation of gambling. Id.
121. Id. at 206 (noting nature of regulation). The gambling ship was specifi-
cally required to procure a number of local permits and perform a long list of
improvement to the waterfront and parking areas. Id.
122. Id. at 205 (presenting objections to gambling boat). In town meetings,
town councilors blatantly objected to the proposed offshore gaming activities. Id.
123. Id. at 208 (holding regulation did not impede cruise ship's ability to
comply with federal statutory requirements). The court's New England Legal deci-
sion provided the necessary leeway for its Leisure Time decision as the court dis-
cussed an impermissible regulation that indirectly attempted to control a
16
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IV. NA1RRTrvE ANALysis
The Alliance case concerns the disjointed and complex
processes through which agencies-federal, state and local-ap-
prove environmental projects, and the underlying tension between
local agencies and the federal government.124 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts emphasized the importance of a stream-
lined approval process that does not impinge on a state's need for
reliable, affordable, and environmentally friendly energy.125 In cre-
ating a slightly more streamlined process, the court also drew a de-
cisive line for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's jurisdictional
reach. 26 The case demonstrates the significance of new energy ini-
tiatives, reconciles the powers of the local agencies in Massachu-
setts, and limits the state's power to inhibit such initiatives.127
A. Reconciling Local Jurisdictional Discrepancies
The court presumed the legislature acted with an awareness of
existing laws.' 28 With no glaring or disabling inconsistencies be-
tween the governing acts or statutes, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts followed the precedential desire set by Harris and
harmoniously molded two pieces of legislation.129 The Siting
Board's enabling statute provides an appeal process for denials of
composite certificates, the result of which gives the Siting Board
final affirmation or denial of the certificate decisions.130 The court
easily recognized the jurisdictional supremacy of the Siting Board
completely permissible federal activity. See supra note 111 for a discussion of the
holding in New England LegaL Leisure Time involved a state regulation controlling
an activity that, while permissible under federal law, was left by the federal govern-
ment for individual state control. See Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 204. The
"cruise to nowhere" in Leisure Time simply sought to avoid that state regulation and
had not been preempted by federal law. Id. at 204; see also infra note 219 for a
discussion of preemption.
124. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 799-800 (Mass. 2010) (describing jurisdictional issues
presented to court both federally and locally).
125. See id. at 797 (explaining purpose of Siting Board).
126. See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's decision to eliminate the overlap of state and federal jurisdiction.
127. See infra notes 128-152 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
court's rationale.
128. See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text for an articulation of how
the court reconciles the seemingly conflicting statutes.
129. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 796 (harmonizing two statutes). The court
stated: "[T]he two statutes can be read together, giving meaning and purpose to
both." Id.
130. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West, Westlaw through 2012)
(providing procedure for issuance of certificate of environmental impact and pub-
lic interest and its composition).
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concerning certificate decisions but struggled with its analysis of Sit-
ing Board jurisdictional authority over Massachusetts' tidelands.13'
The large amount of legislation surrounding the public trust
doctrine and cautious judicial treatment of the doctrine illustrate
the importance of the public trust doctrine.13 2 In an effort to cre-
ate a more streamlined approval process for large renewable energy
initiatives, the Siting Board asked the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts to expand its interpretation of express delegation of
public trust rights.133 The court acknowledged and agreed with the
petitioner's argument that only "an entity to which the Legislature
properly has delegated authority may administer public trust
rights[,]" but finagled its interpretation of the Siting Board's gov-
erning statute to infer such a delegation of authority to the Siting
Board. 134
The court began by analyzing the DEP's authority to "'protect
the interests of the Commonwealth' in the tidelands" as expressly
delegated in its governing statute.133 The Siting Board's governing
statute, however, contained "no mention of public trust rights or
obligations[," but the court asserted the legislature did give the
Siting Board the authority to issue a certificate "in the form of a
composite of all individual permits, approvals or authorizations
which would otherwise be necessary for the construction and opera-
tion of the facility." 3 6 The court thus determined no mention of
131. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (explaining Siting
Board's jurisdictional supremacy over the Commission). But see infra notes 132-141
and accompanying text (discussing public trust doctrine posing challenge to Siting
Board's jurisdictional supremacy).
132. See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
importance of "express" delegation.
133. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799-800 (providing Siting Board's proposed
interpretation of express delegation). The court affirmed the Siting Board's inter-
pretation of express delegations of authority, which streamlined the approval pro-
cess of renewable energy projects because, in granting the Siting Board the
jurisdiction to act in the DEP's shoes, the legislature still required the Siting Board
to conduct the same research as the DEP would have conducted. Id. at 800. A
composite certificate granted by the Siting Board is determined in the same man-
ner and has the same effect as a decision made by the DEP. Id. Because both the
Siting Board and the DEP arrive at the same result, the court concluded that the
Siting Board could act in the DEP's place without overstepping the express grant
of jurisdiction with relation to tidelands licenses. Id.
134. See infra notes 169-182 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's avoidance of the term express.
135. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799 (quoting MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 2
(West, Westlaw through 2012)) (describing DEP's tideland authority).
136. Id. (quoting MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 2 (West, Westlaw through
2012)) (asserting Siting Board stands in place of DEP); see also supra note 130 and
accompanying text (discussing certificate of economic impact and its
composition).
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol23/iss2/3
FROM TAILWIND TO TYPHOON
public trust rights or obligations was necessary because the Siting
Board's governing statute adopted and integrated the DEP's ex-
pressly delegated and vested authority regarding tideland
licensing.' 37
The court found support for its interpretation of the tideland
authority delegation in the apparent redundancy if the Siting
Board was not vested with the power to issue tideland licenses.138
The Siting Board's governing legislation required it to evaluate
whether the facility in question would conform to all "laws, ordi-
nances, and regulations that would otherwise govern it in the ab-
sence of a [Siting Board issued composite] certificate."' 3 9 This
evaluation procedure inherently included the same review process
taken by the DEP and the same powers afforded to the DEP.140
The court, therefore, concluded the legislature delegated "both the
power and the obligation to stand in the shoes of the DEP" to the
Siting Board, and the Siting Board "did not exceed its authority by
including the equivalent of a [DEP issued] tidelands license in the
certificate it granted Cape Wind."' 4
B. The Insurmountable Wall Dividing State and Federal
Jurisdiction.
Where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts blurred
the jurisdictional line between local agencies, it drew a rigid line
between state and federal jurisdiction concerning the in-state im-
pacts of a federally-located facility.' 4 2 The Siting Board limited its
jurisdictional scope by considering the in-state impacts from only
the portion of the proposed facility located outside of federal wa-
ters-the transmission lines connecting the proposed wind facility
137. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799 (giving DEP tideland authority to Siting
Board).
138. Id. at 800 (explaining process through which Siting Board must issue
composite certificates).
139. Id. (describing Siting Board's obligations throughout approval process).
140. Id. at 799 (interpreting Siting Board's governing statute). According to
the court, the Siting Board's governing statutes imposes "an express legislative di-
rective" on the Siting Board "to stand in the shoes of any and all [s]tate and local
agencies with permitting authority over a proposed 'facility.'" Id. This directive
conveys the Siting Board with the right to assume "all the powers and obligations
of such an agency with respect to the decision whether to grant the authorization."
Id.
141. Id. (providing Court's holding concerning tideland's licensing power
granted to Siting Board).
142. See infra notes 186-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rigid division of state and federal jurisdiction.
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to the state electric grid. 143 The petitioners claimed the Siting
Board should have considered "all direct and indirect impacts of
the entire project" before issuing a composite certificate of
approval.144
A literal reading of the Siting Board's statutory language re-
quired the Siting Board to focus on the proposed facilities when
evaluating a composite certificate application.145 The court reiter-
ated that the petitioners conceded the transmission lines were the
only physical facility located within the state waters and thus within
the Siting Board's jurisdiction.14 6 The Siting Board, therefore,
could only evaluate the "the compatibility of the facility" with its
"considerations of environmental protection, public health and
public welfare."147
The court further justified the Siting Board's limited jurisdic-
tion by relying on Maine, which held the federal government has
paramount rights to the offshore seabed, to show that federal juris-
diction controls the outer continental shelf and any waters beyond
three miles from shore.148 It hypothesized that if the Siting Board
considered the impacts of the wind farm itself, the Siting Board
would have the power to deny the facility altogether and thus state
jurisdiction would have trumped federal jurisdiction in violation of
Maine.149 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reiterated
Ten Taxpayer "The [S]iting [B]oard does not have [the] authority
to do indirectly what it cannot do directly."o50 But the court also
relied on Leisure Time to allow the Siting Board to consider the im-
pacts of the transmission lines located in federal waters "because
those impacts relate directly to the 'facility' over which the Siting
Board has jurisdiction."' 5 1 Despite holding state authorities were
143. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 803 (describing Siting Board's interpretation of its
jurisdiction).
144. Id. (providing petitioner's contentions with Siting Board's state
jurisdiction).
145. Id. (demonstrating court's literal reading of facility).
146. See supra note 51 (explaining parties' stipulation that transmission lines
were only physical facility located in state waters).
147. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 803 (showing stipulation properly limited Siting
Board's jurisdiction rigidly to state waters).
148. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 804 (relying on Maine to show supreme federal
jurisdiction over the offshore seabed).
149. Id. (hypothesizing impermissible state jurisdiction trumping federal
jurisdiction).
150. Id. at 805 (utilizing Ten Taxpayer to ensure states do not indirectly regu-
late federally approved and entirely federally located projects).
151. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Leisure Time to demon-
strate Siting Board can evaluate entire length of transmission lines).
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ineligible to evaluate the in-state impacts of the federally-located
wind facility, the court further justified its opinion by assuring that
numerous federal authorities would consider such in-state impacts
in their permitting decision for Cape Wind.1 52
C. A Dissent Attuned to Future Consequences
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the Sit-
ing Board's issuance of a composite certificate, but Chief Justice
Margaret H. Marshall's dissent contended that the delegation of
public trust rights to the Siting Board and the inability of any state
authority to consider the in-state impacts of the federally-located
wind farm were misplaced and disabling for state authority.15 3 First,
the dissent elaborated on the national importance of the public
trust doctrine, and Massachusetts' strong interest in protecting the
public trust as a fiduciary to its citizens.154 It then interpreted Far-
land as authorizing only express delegation of public trust rights and
differentiated the court's reliance on Farland to show properly dele-
gated authority had not been passed to the Siting Board.'5 5 Sec-
ond, the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
allowing the Siting Board to consider the in-state impacts of the
wind farm would constitute a denial of the wind farm altogether.1 5 6
It is the courts' role to regulate the procedures employed to reach
of a decision, not the decision itself, because consideration of the
potential impacts alone does not equate to the denial of a certifi-
cate. 15 7 The dissent contended that the court's holding under-
mined the Siting Board's obligation, if in fact the Siting Board
received the authority to "stand in the shoes of [the] DEP," to act
152. Id. at 805-06 (assuring federal and state agencies scrutinize in-state im-
pacts). Federal statute requires the Coastal Zone Management Office review and
evaluate "[f]ederal permitting decisions relating to a project that affects use of
land, water, or natural resources of a State's coastal zone." Id. at 806 n.35.
153. See infra notes 154-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of each
contention presented by the dissenting opinion.
154. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 816-17 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (describing history and importance of public trust doctrine).
155. Id. (distinguishing interpretations of Farland).
156. Id. at 823 (questioning majority's decision to prohibit consideration of
in-state impacts). The dissent contends the question is whether Massachusetts is
required to consider the potential impacts of the federally located wind farm, not
whether Massachusetts, in its consideration of potential in-state impacts, could
deny the wind farm. Id.
157. Id. at 822-23 (averring court's focus should be on procedure used to ar-
rive at decision, not ultimate outcome, because merely providing procedure for
evaluation does not determine outcome).
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upon its "fiduciary responsibility to protect the interests of the com-
monwealth and its inhabitants, in the tidelands." 15 8
The dissent touted the difficulty in restoring the public trust
doctrine once undermined. 59 Bolstering this point, the dissent ar-
gued the court's opinion pitted the public trust doctrine against the
federal government energy policy when the policies should instead
complement each other.160 The dissenting opinion concluded the
court set a dangerous precedent as it "exalt[ed] regulatory expedi-
ency at the cost of fiduciary obligation."161 It ominously warned
"[a] wind farm today may be a drilling rig or nuclear power plant
tomorrow."162
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts sensed the fed-
eral government's desire for renewable energy sources and the im-
minence of reliable energy initiatives.' 63 While the court properly
upheld the Siting Board's approval of Cape Wind's transmission
lines, it also limited Massachusetts' power to control its own shores
and undermined the public trust doctrine.164 The court expanded
the interpretation of express delegations of authority, created a
more rigid three-mile boundary to the state's jurisdiction, and
paved the way for a less stringent approval process for offshore en-
ergy initiatives.'65
A. A Harmonious Discord of Statutory Language
The court properly recognized the Siting Board's authority to
generally override a decision by the Commission, as well as a deci-
sion by any individual permitting agency involved in the construc-
158. Id. at 822 (internal quotations omitted) (arguing allocated fiduciary re-
sponsibility requires consideration of all possible in-state impacts).
159. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 816 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (stating loss of trust in government and public trust doctrine is not
easily restored).
160. Id. at 824 (describing interaction between public trust doctrine and gov-
ernment energy policy).
161. Id. (summarizing majority's opinion and its potential consequences).
162. Id. at 816 (warning of far reaching consequences).
163. See supra notes 157-162 and infra 164-187 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court's implied desire to promote efficiency and increase renewa-
ble energy sources.
164. See supra notes 138-148 and accompanying text (describing limitations of
state jurisdiction).
165. See generally Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 815-16 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (describing court's interpretation of express delega-
tion as undermining state's authority over its own shores).
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ton and operation of the Cape Wind facility.16 6  It accurately
emphasized the specific language of the Siting Board's governing
statute when granting the Siting Board the general authority over
the approval process.1 6 7 The court's harmonious interpretation,
however, began to falter when it attempted to compare the lan-
guage of the Siting Board's governing statute with the public trust
doctrine.1es
B. "Express Delegation" Leaves Room for Interpretation?
Under the public trust doctrine, "only [Massachusetts], or an
entity to which the Legislature properly has delegated authority,
may administer public trust rights." 169 The court in Fafard empha-
sized that an express delegation embodied the appropriate delega-
tion with little room for inferences, and exemplified how courts
should first look "to see whether there was . .. an express legislative
intent to forbid local activity on the same subject."170 In Fafard, as
in Alliance, there was no legislation that expressly delegated author-
ity to the agency in question concerning the litigation action.171 In
both cases, therefore, the court was "confronted with one of the
hard cases . . . in which it is asserted that a legislative intent to bar
local action should be inferred in all the circumstances."17 2
According to the court in Fafard, a court can infer the legisla-
tive intent to bar an action where the "local regulation would some-
166. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (explaining rationale behind
seeking statutory harmony and Siting Board's overriding authority)
167. See supra notes 75-76, 132-141 and accompanying text (exploring court's
analysis of Siting Board's supreme authority over approval process)
168. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 797-99 (comparing public trust doctrine to
Siting Board's governing statute); see also Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n of Barn-
stable, 733 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Mass. 2000) (explaining delegation of public trust
rights).
169. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 799 (describing delegation of authority under
public trust doctrine). See supra notes 78-101 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of authorities with public trust rights.
170. Fafard, 733 N.E.2d at 71 (alteration in original) (quoting Boston Gas Co.
v. City of Somerville, 652 N.E.2d 132, 133 (Mass. 1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (describing beginning of court's determination of whether local ordi-
nances are inconsistent with state statute). See supra notes 82-88 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Farland.
171. Compare supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (explaining lack of ex-
press delegation of authority in Fafard), with supra note 47 and accompanying text
(describing DEP as covered under Siting Board authority even without express
delegation).
172. See Fafard, 733 N.E.2d at 72 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of
Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 476 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Mass. 1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (acknowledging existence of certain situations in which legislative
intent to bar local action should be always be inferred).
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how frustrate the purpose of the statute so as to warrant an
inference that the Legislature intended to preempt [the ac-
tion] ."" The regulations challenged in Fafard did not "usurp the
DEP's authority to deny licenses or permits to applicants who seek
to build structures that do not serve [a proper public] purpose."1 74
Instead, the regulations required a local permit in addition to the
state requirements for applicants. 75
The Supreme Judicial Court in Alliance relied almost exclu-
sively on Fafard to support its reading of the legislation affecting the
Siting Board, but conveniently avoided the value Fafard placed on
the express delegation of authority. 76 Unlike the DEP's governing
legislation, there is no express language in the Siting Board's gov-
erning statute allocating authority over the tidelands to the Siting
Board.1'7 The court deviated from history and the precedent sur-
rounding public trust rights by expanding the public trust authority
to any entity whose governing statute can be interpreted to show
even a tangential connection to public trust rights. 78
Further, Alliance is inconsistent with Fafard as it allows the Sit-
ing Board to "usurp the DEP's authority."179 In Alliance, the com-
posite certificate issued by the Siting Board served as the only, not
additional, license-unlike the additional requirements imposed in
Fafard.so The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts broadened
the potential for local agencies to discover an implied authority
over the public trust rights and granted the Siting Board supreme
173. Id. (quoting Boston Gas Co. v. Newton, 682 N.E.2d 1336, 1399 (Mass.
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (exemplifying situation in which legis-
lative intent to bar local action should always be inferred).
174. Id. at 72-73 (upholding pier regulations because DEP's authority was not
undermined).
175. Id. at 74 (allowing permitting additions provided there is no usurpation
of DEP authority).
176. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 799-801 (Mass. 2010) (avoiding express delegation of author-
ity issue as addressed in Fafard).
177. Compare MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 164, § 69K (West, Westlaw through
2012) (lacking express delegation of Siting Board authority over tidelands), with
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch 91, § 14 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (delegating ex-
press authority to DEP over tidelands).
178. See infra notes 180-183 and accompanying text (explaining historical ten-
dencies when allocating public trust rights); see also supra notes 169-177 and infra
notes 179-182 and accompanying text (discussing court's deviation from historical
tendencies when allocating public trust rights).
179. Compare Fafard, 733 N.E.2d at 72 (describing delegation of authority),
with Alliance 932 N.E.2d at 801 (showing delegation of authority in Alliance has
different effect than delegation of authority in Fafard).
180. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 800-01 (concluding Siting Board did not im-
pose additional restrictions but rather acted in DEP's place).
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jurisdiction over the DEP in future cases requiring a tideland li-
cense.18 ' The court eliminated some of the potential red tape and
redundancy surrounding the elongated energy project permitting
process, but also confirmed the fear articulated by the court in
Golden by creating a lenient precedent that could be used to pre-
vent local communities from exercising regulatory control.18 2
C. Building an Insurmountable, Rigid Separation Between State
and Federal Jurisdiction
The DEP, or any agency entrusted with administering public
trust rights, has an obligation to protect the state's interest in the
tidelands.xas The federal government has retained exclusive con-
trol over the outer continental shelf and adopted an energy policy
actively promoting offshore development of renewable energy.18 4
The Siting Board's responsibility to provide a reliable energy supply
for Massachusetts is seemingly supportive of both the public trust
doctrine and the federal government's energy initiative, yet Alliance
pits the public trust doctrine against the federal government's en-
ergy policy by prohibiting the Siting Board's consideration of in-
state impacts of the proposed wind farm.' 85
Before Alliance, the Massachusetts courts clearly had not
reached consensus on the permissible level of interaction between
state and federal authorities.186 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts attempted to define and consolidate previously in-
consistent holdings but overreached in its interpretation and re-
strictions.187 The precedent does not require an outright ban on
181. See supra notes 169-182 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the court reinterpreted express delegation of authority.
182. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 797-98 (describing and affirming Siting
Board's purpose to streamline permitting process). The court relied on City Coun-
cil ofAgawam v. Enery Facilities Siting Bd., 776 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 2002) to show the
community's desire for a "reliable, affordable, and environmentally sound energy
supply" and the Siting Board's role in ensuring the community's desire was
achieved. Id. at 797.
183. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of public
trust rights and the duty involved in protecting them.
184. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of fed-
eral jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf.
185. See Alliance 932 N.E.2d at 816 (dissenting because majority's opinion pits
public trust doctrine against federal government's strong desire for renewable
energy).
186. See supra notes 107-123 and accompanying text for contrasting opinions
on permissible level of state involvement in federal activity.
187. See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's overextension of authority and misplaced reliance on certain precedential
decisions.
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any state decision contemplating a federally authorized action.188
In fact, the court in Leisure Time permitted state regulation of an
activity ancillary to a federally-located operation. 89 In holding the
"law in question [must] actually conflict[ ] with federal law ... such
that compliance with both [local] and federal law is a physical im-
possibility," the court in Leisure Time demonstrated how state law
could supplement federal law.190 Unlike Alliance, Leisure Time also
recognized that the procedure does not necessarily determine the
outcome, and it is not the court's duty to regulate the procedure
based on a potential outcome.191
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts incorrectly relied
on the facts of Ten Taxpayer because no part of a federally-located
facility or operation in Ten Taxpayer crossed into state jurisdiction-
every facet of the facility at issue in Ten Taxpayer was located within
federal jurisdiction.19 2 Both courts correctly recognized "[an
agency] does not have the authority to do indirectly what it cannot
do directly," but in Alliance the portion of the wind farm located in
188. Compare Ten Taxpayer Citizens Group v. Cape Wind Associates, LLC, 373
F.3d 183, 197 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding state decision contemplating federally
located activity), with Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of Barnstable, 62 F. Supp.
2d 202, 204 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding no outright ban exists on state interaction
with federal activities).
189. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's holding in Leisure Time.
190. Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(indicating state regulation may involve federal activity in some form); see also Ca-
sino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing caution
in analyzing possible preemption of state law by federal law because state laws are
generally intended to promote public welfare). The Fourth Circuit confirmed the
district court's Leisure Time holding in Casino Ventures, a case with similar facts as
Leisure Time. Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 310. The court stated: "[S]tate law is
preempted if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Compare Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 208-09 (stating procedure does
not determine outcome), with Alliance 932 N.E.2d 787, 804-05 (implying state regu-
lation or authority would have conclusive negative outcome for entirety of pro-
ject). The court in Alliance assumed that to permit a state agency's involvement in
the regulation of a federal activity would essentially grant the state authority over
the federal activity. Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 805. The court in Leisure Time, however,
allowed such supplemental state regulation, which thus enabled the state agency's
involvement in regulating a federal activity without trumping federal jurisdiction.
Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
192. Ten Taxpayer, 373 F.3d at 186 (describing location of proposed facility).
Unlike the data collection facility in Ten Taxpayer, which was located entirely in
federal waters with no effect in state waters, the wind farm in Alliance physically
crossed into state jurisdiction; thus, the court should distinguish between the two
facilities and reach divergent holdings. See generally infra note 193 and supra note
32 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts' jurisdiction directly impacted the public.19 3 By ac-
counting for the in-state impact of the entire facility, the Siting
Board would not necessarily denying the federally approved facility
but rather supplement the federal law approving the facility. 19 4
Thus, the Alliance court improperly restricted the Siting Board's
evaluation exclusively to the physical part of a facility is located in
the state based on the misguided notion that such evaluations
would inherently lead to a denial of the entire facility and state law
trumping federal law.195 Stripping Massachusetts of its ability to
evaluate the in-state impacts of a project as a whole set a dangerous
precedent, especially when a portion of the project is located in
state waters.196
VI. IMPACT
The growing energy crisis promises to infiltrate every facet of
society, which has resulted in a general concern about a future with-
out renewable energy.197 Both foreign countries and the federal
government increasingly pressure citizens and corporations to
adopt new lifestyles.198 Money exists in renewable energy initia-
tives; it is available for start-up companies, from which future-savvy
investors can realize enormous profits. 199 Technological advances
allow the United States to harness wind, water, and solar energy to
heat homes, power infrastructure, and run transportation sys-
tems.200 Renewable energy is now out-sprinting the legislation, and
courts must therefore tread with caution when addressing renewa-
193. See supra note 32 and accompanying text for a description of the physi-
cal location of the transmission lines located within state jurisdiction.
194. See Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (holding state's interaction with
federal activity was not necessarily automatic regulation of federal activity
automatically).
195. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text (suggesting some state
interaction with federal activity is both necessary and permissible).
196. See supra notes 153-166 and accompanying text (elaborating potential
consequences of court's holding), supra notes 142-152 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing court's strict limitation on state jurisdiction).
197. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of industries
potentially affected by an energy crisis.
198. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal
programs implemented to spur renewable energy initiatives.
199. See Steve Hargreaves, Renewable Energy Funds Are Booming,
CNNMONEY.COM (Jun. 15, 2007, 6:02 AM), http://money.CNN.com/2007/06/14/
markets/altenergy.investing/index.htm (illustrating strong returns from mutual
funds specializing in renewable energy).
200. See Cameron Walker, The Future of Alternative Energy, NATIONAL GEO-
GRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2004), http://news.NationalGeographic.com/news/
2004/10/1028041028_alternative-energy.html (exploring various sources and
uses of renewable energy).
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ble energy initiatives.201 A war is brewing in the guise of renewable
energy between the legislative and the judicial branches on both a
national and state level that has the ability to threaten national
sovereignty. 202
"Not in my backyard" is a phrase often associated with large
renewable energy projects. 2 0 3 Many local groups, formed to protect
the public from corporate moneymaking schemes, oppose large en-
ergy projects. 2 0 4 These groups are influential within local commu-
nities, and often have the power to influence permitting decisions
concerning large renewable energy projects. 2 05 As a result of such
opposition, renewable energy projects experience unreasonably
long delays, encounter years of litigation, and assume enormous ex-
penses even after project approval.206 The Cape Wind project is the
nation's first proposed offshore wind facility and has thus exper-
ienced widespread opposition with little evidentiary support dem-
onstrating its efficiency and vitality.207
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts' decision in Alli-
ance to uphold the Siting Board's approval of solely the transmis-
sion lines marks a turning point in the internal war concerning the
Cape Wind project.208 The court sought to eliminate the redun-
dancies within the approval process by granting the Siting Board
201. See Alex Guillen, GOP 2012 Agenda: What Energy Debate?, POLITICO (Oct.
18, 2011 4:46 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66281.html
(describing GOP candidates pushing for long term renewable energy through
wind and solar policies, though such legislation has often failed).
202. SeeJuliano, supra note 11 (discussing tensions between legislatures and
increased litigation created by renewable energy proposals).
203. See Filippo Zuliani, Green Energy-But Not In My Back Yard!, PRESSEUROP
(May 6, 2011), http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/639811-green-en-
ergy-not-my-back-yard (describing not in my back yard opposition to renewable
energy projects).
204. See Lisa Gibson, Facing the Vocal Opposition, BIOMASS POWER & THERMAL
http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/3741/facing-the-vocal-opposition (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2011) (exemplifying local group's opposition to renewable energy).
205. See id. (showing locals group's success in quashing construction of bio-
mass power plant); see also Tom Donohue, Progress Denied: How Red Tape Is Costing
jobs, FREE ENTERPRISE MAGAZINE (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.USChamberMaga-
zine.com/article/progress-denied-how-red-tape-is-costing-jobs (opining about
"broken permitting process" and environmental activists' resourcefulness and de-
termination to destroy clean energy projects).
206. See Gibson, supra note 206 (contending financial concerns of lengthy liti-
gation halted project); see alsoJuliano, supra note 11 and accompanying text (ex-
ploring issues of "red tape" and increased cost surrounding litigation).
207. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting
Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 792 (Mass. 2010) (describing history of Cape Wind's efforts to
secure necessary permits).
208. See infra notes 209-217 and accompanying text for a discussion of possi-
ble impacts of the court's holding in Alliance.
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the final say and the authority over public trust rights. 209 The deci-
sion further acknowledged the bureaucracy used by many permit-
ting agencies to delay construction, provide more time to voice
opinions, and increase costs for corporations. 210 In attempting to
minimize such bureaucracy, the court misinterpreted the meaning
of proper delegation of authority and undermined the significance
of express delegations of public trust rights. 211 The ability to now
infer public trust rights without an express delegation creates more
situations in which competing agencies will assume public trust au-
thority-even without a clause similar to the one granting the Sit-
ing Board supreme jurisdiction.212
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts focused on the
Siting Board and the other interacting Massachusetts' agencies. 213
The rationale of the court, however, has far-reaching conse-
quences. 214 The court sought to eliminate unnecessary evaluation
and approval processes, but in doing so limited the state's voice,
whether supportive or resistant.215 Jurisdictions now have the abil-
ity to infer public trust rights to create a streamlined approval pro-
cess within the state, eliminating some red tape but also eliminating
potentially valuable barriers and input from opposition.216 As pre-
viously noted by the dissent, "a wind farm today may be a drilling
rig or nuclear power plant tomorrow."21'
Expediting the approval process for renewable energy projects
is an important endeavor; but courts must ensure, unlike in Alli-
ance, that such expedition does allow federal authorities to impinge
209. See supra notes 124-141 and accompanying text for a description of the
court's rationale in approving the Siting Board's decision.
210. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 797-98 (discussing court's decision to elimi-
nate redundancy by streamlining permitting process).
211. See supra notes 169-182 and accompanying text (deciding to expand
meaning of express delegation, while limiting state authority to consider in-state
impacts of federally located facilities)
212. See supra notes 169-182 and accompanying text for court's reinterpreta-
tion of express and implications surrounding such inferred delegation.
213. See generally, Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facili-
ties Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787, 797 (Mass. 2010) (describing issues as relative to
Massachusetts law and statutes).
214. See supra note 208-221 and accompanying text for a description of the
consequences potentially resulting from the court's decision.
215. See supra notes 124-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of
court's reasoning and conclusion.
216. See supra notes 163-182 and accompanying text for a illustration of how
the court's holding eliminated some redundancy in permitting decisions.
217. See Alliance, 932 N.E.2d at 816 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (providing context for quotation).
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on state sovereignty. 218 The state legislature must recognize and
anticipate the necessity of renewable energy projects so agencies
are not hopelessly pitted against each other in power struggles.219
Despite undermining the public trust doctrine and limiting certain
voices, Alliance has nonetheless paved the way for the approval of
the United States' first proposed offshore wind facility.220 The deci-
sion was a step toward maintaining national sovereignty, indepen-
dent of foreign energy imports, and toward creating more reliable,
efficient, and environmentally aware renewable energy.221
Spencer Curtis*
218. See Gibson, supra note 204 (discussing impact litigation costs on failure
of renewable energy project); see also supra notes 183-196 and accompanying text
(criticizing court's for limitation on state's authority to consider in-state impacts of
federally located facility).
219. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-
sumption that the legislature acts with full knowledge of existing laws. See also
Shanna L. Peterson, High Stakes and Low Tides: The Fourth Circuit Gambles by Forbid-
ding Riverboat Casinos in Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 397,
420-24 (2000) (criticizing court's interpretation of conflict preemption). The arti-
cle emphasizes the importance of congressional intent, shown through legislative
history, and plain language as important factors in deciding preemption of state
law by federal law. Id. at 423. It further accused the federal court of judicial activ-
ism, but "the basic idea behind conflict preemption is that performing the permit-
ted act under federal law without violating state law would be impossible." Id. at
421. Unlike the court in Alliance, however, the court in Casino Ventures did not find
performance of an act permitted under federal law without violating state law im-
possible. See generally Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1999).
The federal court thus placed a higher value on the "basic idea behind conflict
preemption" than on the implied preemptive intent of Congress. Peterson, supra,
at 421; see Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 313. Casino Ventures suggests the legislature
should explicitly demonstrate its preemptive intent in order to prevent courts from
actively attempting to supplement or mold state law to supplement federal law. See
Peterson, supra, at 425. The court in Alliance did the opposite in presupposing that
permitting state review of in-state impacts of a federally located facility would de-
termine the outcome and override federal law. See supra notes 192-196 and accom-
panying text.
220. See generally Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities
Siting Bd, 932 N.E.2d 797, 815 (Mass. 2010) (upholding Siting Board's granting of
composite certificate for all permits necessary for transmission lines leading to fed-
erally approved facility).
221. See Project At A Glance, CAPEWIND.ORG http://www.CapeWind.org/arti-
cle24.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (showing importance of Cape Wind Project
for achieving energy independence, reliable energy, lower energy costs, more jobs,
and cleaner air).
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2010, Villa-
nova University.
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